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CAN GOOD MEDICINE BE BAD LAW?
In re Haymer
115 Ill. App. 3d 349, 450 N.E.2d 940 (1983)
I. INTRODUCTION
A growing majority of states now recognize brain death as a legal
definition of death. ' Prior to In re Haymer,2 the law of Illinois was silent
as to when death occurred. The Haymer decision has now placed Illinois
in the majority on the issue of defining death.
Under the common law, the absence of pulse, heartbeat, and breath-
ing defined death. 3 Life support technology has made this approach in-
adequate. 4 Today, hearts can be restarted and breathing maintained
mechanically; patients who once faced certain death now can be revived.
Revival, however, may mean anything from complete recovery to perma-
nent coma.
Medical developments have forced corresponding developments in
the law. The status of victims of crimes, disease, and accidents who are
dead by neurological standards, but living by the common law definition
(due to technological support) has prompted both litigation and
legislation.
Haymer is Illinois' first courtroom encounter with a conflict between
the common law standard and modern medicine. This comment dis-
cusses the Haymer court's resolution of the conflict in favor of brain
death, the propriety of judicial adoption of brain death, and its implica-
tions for future Illinois law.
II. HISTORY OF BRAIN DEATH
Medical Developments
By the late 1950's, life saving technology made it possible to main-
tain respiration artificially even if the patient was comatose and unable to
1. At least 34 states had adopted brain death in some form at the time of the decision in In re
Haymer. Haymer, 115 I11. App. 3d 349, 352, 450 N.E.2d 940, 943, 71 111. Dec. 252, 255 (1st Dist.
1983).
2. Id.
3. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1983) is the first edition to contain a brain death
definition, based on non-vital sign criteria.
4. Research also continues on the use of artificial and animal organs in humans. See Ethical
Issues Debated After Successful Implant of Second Artificial Heart, Amer. Med. News, Dec. 7, 1984,
at 1, col. 3.
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breathe spontaneously. 5 Medicine began to investigate new methods to
ascertain death based on brain function6 such as the electroencephalo-
gram. 7 Other factors that hastened this investigation were increased ac-
tivity in organ transplants," the high cost of extraordinary life support, 9
and possibilities of physicians' criminal and civil liability.10 A shift to
neurological criteria meant more than a change in diagnostic technique.
Because a premature brain death diagnosis is a self-fulfilling prophecy
once life support is terminated and somatic (bodily) death occurs," the
need for accurate diagnosis was imperative.
The most important single event in the development of the medical
definition of death was the publication of the Report of the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain
Death 12 ("Harvard Report"). The diagnostic criteria of the Harvard Re-
port basically evaluated different types of involuntary reflexes. The
Harvard Report was, and still is, very influential, but the criteria have
been criticized 13 and the committee itself has been called "biased" and
"paternalistic". 14 Other tests have been proposed in addition to the
Harvard Report's criteria, such as angiography, ultrasound, arterial flow
studies, and chemical body fluid tests. 15 Medical opinion clearly sup-
ports the validity of the brain death standard. 16 The lingering disputes
concern which diagnostic criteria are the most reliable.
5. R. CONNELLY, LAST RIGHTS 36 (1982).
6. A paper published in 1902 may have been a forerunner of the brain death controversy. It
reports a case of artificial respiration for 23 hours after the stoppage of spontaneous respiration.
Cushing, Some Experimental and Clinical Observations Concerning States of Increased Intracranial
Tension, 124 AM. J. MED. ScI. 375 (1902).
7. See Hamlin, Life or Death by EEG, 190 J. A.M.A. 112 (1964).
8. Proper care of the potential donor pool could create 10,000 donors per year. 3 M. HouTS,
I. HAUT, COURTROOM MEDICINE, Death, lB-5 (1983). Such a large donor pool is an obvious incen-
tive to improve transplant technology and increase the frequency of its application. Authority to
declare death on cessation of brain function is almost essential to efficient transplant procedures.
9. The average cost to maintain a comatose patient is $600 to $1,000 per day. Id. at IB-6.
10. Veith, Special Communication: Brain Death, 238 J.A.M.A. 1744 (1977).
11. Black, Medical Progress: Brain Death (Part I), 299 N.E.J.M. 338, 339 (1978).
12. Special Communication: A Definition of Irreversible Coma: Report of the Ad Hoc Commit-
tee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death, 205 J. A.M.A. 337
(1968).
13. van Till, Diagnosis of Death in Comatose Patients Under Resuscitation Treatment: A Criti-
cal Review of the Harvard Report, 2 AM. J. LAW. MED. 1:1 (1976).
14. R. CONNELLY, supra, note 5 at 41.
15. Angiography is a method of rendering blood vessels visible on X-ray film by injection of a
radio-opaque material. BLACK'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 50 (33rd ed. 1981). Many of the proposed
tests are resisted by United States physicians because of the tests' invasive nature. Black, supra, note
II at 342.
16. An editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine states "it is clear that a person is not
dead unless his brain is dead." Sweet, Brain Death, 299 N.E.J.M. 410 (1978).
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Brain Death and the Courts
In pre-brain death survivorship cases, 17 slight evidence of vital signs
was sufficient to convince a court that one person predeceased another.
In Sauers v. Stolz, 1 8 testimony that the husband had a slight heartbeat for
a brief time after an auto accident and that blood was spurting from his
head was enough to convince a court that he had "outlived" his wife,
whose nostrils were filled with dust, indicating no breath had been taken
after the accident. In Vaegamast v. Hess,19 complicated medical evidence
"proved" that a husband's heart stopped beating before his wife's when
their car was struck by a train.20 In Smith v. Smith, 2t an executor sought
to bring a will under Arkansas' simultaneous death statute22 by arguing
that a woman's irreversible coma, caused by the same accident that killed
her husband, was equivalent to death since she and her husband had both
lost cognitive function at the same time.23 The court rejected this asser-
tion24 in favor of the traditional definition of death which it quoted from
Black's Law Dictionary.
2 5
Court tests of the modem brain death concept have often involved a
criminal defendant's theory that the physician is an intervening cause
when respiration is terminated.2 6 In State v. Fierro,27 the court rejected a
criminal defendant's appeal based on this argument.28 The court held
that removal of life support was not an alteration of the victim's natural
progression after the shooting. Contemporary courts have uniformly re-
jected this form of challenge to brain death diagnoses.
2 9
17. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 229 Ark. 579, 317 S.W.2d 275 (1958); Thomas v. Anderson, 96
Colo. App. 2d 371, 215 P.2d 478 (1950); Vaegamast v. Hess, 203 Minn. 207, 280 N.W. 641 (1938).
18. 121 Colo. 456, 218 P.2d 741 (1950).
19. 203 Minn. 207, 280 N.W. 641 (1938).
20. Vaegamast reflects the single-minded emphasis once given to traditional vital signs. Medi-
cal testimony showed that the husband's spinal cord was severed on impact, and that heartbeat and
respiration ceased within two minutes after that. The wife was thrown from the car and run over by
the train, which crushed the top of her skull. A judgment that the husband died first was based on
the fine medical distinction that the wife's heart probably continued to beat for a short time beyond
her husband's death. Id. at 210, 280 N.W. at 643.
21. 229 Ark. 579, 317 S.W.2d 275 (1958).
22. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-124 (1980).
23. Given the state of medical technology at the time, it is doubtful that Smith was a case of
brain death, but probably was one of persistent vegetative state, in which cognition is permanently
lost, but spontaneous respiration continues. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert
denied sub noma., Gorger v. N.J., 429 U.S. 922 (1977).
24. 229 Ark. at 580, 317 S.W.2d at 279.
25. See supra text accompanying note 3.
26. State v. Fierro, 124 Ariz. 182, 603 P.2d 74 (1979); State v. Meints, 212 Neb. 410, 322
N.W.2d 809 (1978); State v. Johnson, 56 Ohio St. 2d 35, 381 N.E.2d 637 (1978); State v. Brown, 8
Or. App. 72, 491 P.2d 1193 (1971); Cranmore v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 722, 271 N.W.2d 402 (1978).
27. 124 Ariz. 182, 603 P.2d 74 (1979).
28. Id. at 185, 603 P.2d at 77.
29. Id. Constitutionally based arguments against the application of brain death laws or defini-
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Brain Death Legislation
Current brain death statutes30 fall into three categories: 31 1) some
recognize both neurological and traditional signs of death; 2) some recog-
nize brain death only when death cannot be ascertained by traditional
means; and 3) some mandate brain death as the only criteria for death.
32
Existing brain death statutes have generally withstood court challenges,
33
but problems have arisen when a statute is confusing or poorly worded.
Thus, in State v. Robaczynski,34 a mistrial was declared when a jury was
unable to reach a verdict in a case involving the Maryland brain death
statute.35  The apparent reason for the mistrial was the statute's use of
the term "spontaneous brain function." The prosecution relied upon re-
corded brain activity to show the victim of an alleged murder was alive
when the defendant nurse disconnected respiration without authority.
The defense argued that the brain activity, elicited by external means,
was not "spontaneous," therefore the state had failed to prove that the
patient was alive at the time of the act.
36
tions have also not been persuasive. An argument that judicial recognition of brain death had an "ex
post facto" effect was rejected in Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249, 366 N.E.2d 744, cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1977). In People v. Vandeford, 77 Mich. App. 370, 258 N.W.2d 502 (1977),
the argument that a brain death law was unconstitutionally vague was rejected. If the legislature has
not already enacted a brain death law, generally the state's first exposure to a conflict in death
standards is through a criminal defendant's appeal of brain death through decision or statute, or, as
in Haymer, parent or guardian efforts to prevent termination of support after a brain death
diagnosis.
30. ALA. CODE §§ 22-31-1 through 22-31-4 (Cum. Supp. 1979); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-537
through 82-539 (Supp. 1983); ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.120 (1983); CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE
§§ 7180-7182 (Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-136 (1981); FLA. STAT. § 382.085 (1980);
GA. CODE ANN. § 88-1716 (Cum. Supp. 1980); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 327 C-I (Supp. 1979); I.C.
§ 54-1819 (Cum. Supp. 1981); IOWA CODE ANN. § 702.8 (1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:111
(Cum. Supp. 1983); MD. ANN. CODE HG 5-203 (1982); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.15 (1021-1024)
(Cum. Callaghan Supp. 1981); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. 50-22-101 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 451.007 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-4 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-323 (Cum. Supp. 1979);
OHIO REV. CODE § 2108.30 (1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 1-301(g) (Cum. Supp. 1981); OR.
REV. STAT. § 146.001 (1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-459 (Cum. Supp. 1980); TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 4447t (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1985); VA. CODE § 54-325.7 (Cum. Supp. 1979); W. VA.
CODE § 16-19-1 (1979); Wyo. STAT. § 35-19.101 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
31. Of the various model and existing statutes, the text of the Uniform Determination of Death
Act (hereinafter UDDA) has been given the broadest support: "An individual who has suffered
either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation
of all functions of the entire brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be made in accord-
ance with acceptable medical standards." 12 U.L.A. 237 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
32. Cook, The Legal Implications of Brain Death, I MED. LAW 135, 138 (1982).
33. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
34. No. 578-23001 (Criminal Court of Baltimore 1979) as discussed in DEFINING DEATH: A
REPORT ON THE MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH:
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF MEDICINE AND BIOMEDI-
CAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, 139-40 (1981) (hereinafter President's Commission).
35. MD. ANN. CODE HG 5-203 (1982).
36. A living patient may yield a flat EEG, but certain external stimuli can elicit recordable
neurological activity. If this is the case, a comatose patient may fully recover. M. HOUTS, supra
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Robaczynski dealt with a statute that involved an ambiguous defini-
tion. Another problem of ambiguity occurs when brain death is incorpo-
rated into special purpose legislation. In Bacchiochi v. Johnson Memorial
Hospital,3 7 a doctor refused to terminate life support from a patient who
was brain dead. The doctor feared criminal prosecution because the only
expression of a brain death standard appeared in the state's organ trans-
plant law 38 and the patient was not a potential organ donor. The case
was resolved by an informal promise not to prosecute. 39 Both Bacchiochi
and Robaczynski are representative of potential problems that can arise
from poorly planned incorporations of brain death into statutory law.
III. FACTS OF THE HAYMER CASE
On November 4, 1982, physicians at Loyola University of Chicago
Hospital were authorized by court order to disconnect artificial life sup-
port systems sustaining the respiration of a seven-month-old infant, Alex
B. Haymer. Physicians had determined on October 23, 1982 that the
infant's total brain function had ceased. 4°
The parents opposed the order and a stay was granted pending an
expedited appeal. Before the appeal was heard, the child's heart stopped
functioning despite artificial support.41 The issue contested on appeal
was whether legal death occurred when the child's brain ceased function-
ing or when his heart stopped beating.
Even though the infant had died, the court declined to dismiss on
the grounds of "technical mootness" 42 because of the important social
nature of the case and because dismissal would not resolve the disputed
date of death.43 The court concluded that in addition to declarations of
death made according to traditional vital signs, "a person who has sus-
tained irreversible cessation of total brain function" can also be declared
dead.44 Therefore, either 1) irreversible cessation of total brain function
or 2) irreversible cessation of respiratory function (both according to cus-
tomary medical standards) is now the Illinois standard for determining
note 8 at IB-08 and 1B-56. The status of such a patient may have been the issue in Robaczynski. See
President's Commission, supra note 34 at 145.
37. As reported by Fabro, Bacchiochi vs. Johnson Memorial Hospital, 45 CONN. MED. 267
(1981), and Fabro, The Bacchiochi Case-Continued, 45 CONN. MED. 334 (1981).
38. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-139i(b) (1979).
39. See supra, note 37 at 335.
40. In re Haymer, 115 Ill. App. 3d 349, 350, 450 N.E.2d 940, 942, 71111. Dec. 252, 254 (1st Cir.
1983).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 357, 450 N.E.2d at 946, 71 11. Dec. at 258.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 355, 450 N.E.2d at 945, 71 11. Dec. at 257.
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death.45 The court held that Alex Haymer died on October 23, the day
of the brain death diagnosis.
IV. ANALYSIS
Opinion
The court's analysis began by noting that medical advances have
rendered the "vital signs" definition of death inadequate in some situa-
tions. The court devoted more attention, however, to the propriety of
judicial adoption of the brain death standard than to the medical evi-
dence supporting the theory. The court emphasized two points to sup-
port judicial adoption of the brain death standard. First, the court found
legislative support for the standard in the Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act,46 amended to include a brain death standard.47 The court also
pointed out that a substantial majority of states (at least 34 at the time of
the opinion) had adopted brain death in some form.
48
The court relied on the Washington case of In re Welfare of Bow-
man,49 and the Colorado case of Lovato v. District Court,50 two cases
with fact patterns similar to Haymer, to reject the argument that the shift
to brain death is one properly left to the legislators. Both Bowman and
Lovato involved parent or guardian objections to termination of life sup-
port on children declared brain dead.
The Haymer court followed the Bowman court position that it is
"appropriate and proper" 51 to decide the question of whether brain death
is valid in the face of a lack of statutory guidance. 52 The Haymer court
also followed Lovato in recognizing the authority of the legislature to
resolve the brain death issue, but that the court nonetheless has the
"duty" to be responsive to the recent generation of medical advances that
has made the common law definition of death obsolete. 53
The Haymer court drew its mandate to reform Illinois law from Al-
vis v. Ribar.54 In Alvis, the Illinois Supreme Court abandoned the doc-
trine of contributory negligence as a defense in tort actions, and adopted
45. 115 Ill. App. 3d at 356, 450 N.E.2d at 945, 71 111. Dec. at 257.
46. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, par. 302(b) (1981).
47. In re Haymer, 115 Il1. App. 3d at 354, 450 N.E.2d at 943, 71 111. Dec. at 257.
48. Id.
49. 94 Wash. 2d 407, 617 P.2d 731 (1980).
50. 198 Colo. 419, 601 P.2d 1072 (1979).
51. 115 IIl. App. 3d at 353, 450 N.E.2d at 944, 71 Ill. Dec. at 256 (quoting Bowman, 94
Wash.2d 406, 420, 617 P.2d at 738).
52. Id.
53. Id. (quoting Lovato, supra note 50).
54. 85 I11. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886, 52 Ill. Dec. 23 (1981).
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instead the doctrine of comparative negligence. The Haymer court uses
the language of Alvis to support the position that when the legislature has
failed to remedy a gap in the common law, it is "imperative" that the
judiciary act to do so."
Alvis, however, is not as unilaterally supportive of judicial reform as
Haymer would suggest. There were two dissents in Alvis, each emphasiz-
ing that a shift to comparative negligence was one better left to the legis-
lature.5 6 Judicial reform was more appropriate in Alvis than in Haymer,
because contributory negligence was a doctrine of judicial creation 57 and
already riddled with exceptions.5 8 Also, because there were alternative
forms of comparative negligence 59 available, the Alvis dissents argued
that the legislative branch is best equipped to make a choice.6° A similar
argument could be made for leaving to the legislature the selection of
which type of brain death standard to follow, especially in such a factu-
ally complex area of law.
The Haymer court emphasized that Illinois lawmakers supported
brain death through the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act.61 Alvis was also
confronted with legislative intent expressed in a statute, but reached a
different conclusion than did Haymer. In Alvis, the party arguing against
adoption of comparative negligence relied on the presence of contribu-
tory negligence in several statutes to support the theory that the legisla-
ture intended to retain contributory negligence. 62  The Alvis court
rejected this argument, stating that the statutes were only legislative re-
statements of the then-existing law as expressed by the court. 63 This kind
of narrow reading applied to Haymer could have supported a finding that
the legislature was expressly limiting brain death applications to trans-
plant cases. 64
The Haymer decision adopts a brain death standard basically identi-
55. 115 Ill. App. 3d at 353, 450 N.E.2d at 944, 71 11. Dec. at 256.
56. 85 111. 2d at 29, 35 N.E.2d at 898, 901, 71 111. Dec. at 35, 38.
57. Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809).
58. Exceptions based on "wanton" conduct, statutes to protect plaintiffs, and "last clear
chance" are discussed in Alvis, 85 I1. 2d at 10, 421 N.E.2d 890, 71 111. Dec. at 27.
59. "Pure" comparative negligence is differentiated from "modified" comparative negligence in
Alvis, 85 Ill.2d at 25, 421 N.E.2d at 597, 74 Ill. Dec. at 34.
60. See 85 Ill. 2d at 29, 421 N.E.2d at 899, 71 111. Dec. at 35 (Underwood, J., dissenting).
61. See supra note 46.
62. Alvis, 85 Il. 2d at 23, 421 N.E.2d at 896, 71 111. Dec. at 33.
63. Id.
64. With respect to the inclusion of the brain death standard in the Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act, supra note 46, the Illinois Catholic Conference said "Great caution must ... be exercised in
interpreting the present legal definition of death for transplant purposes already written into the
Illinois Anatomical Gift Act. Watchful care is needed to block its extension into other areas." Pam-
phlet, ON DEATH AND DYING: A STATEMENT OF THE ILLINOIS CATHOLIC CONFERENCE (Ap-
proved Mar. 11, 1978).
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cal to that used in the Uniform Determination of Death Act.65 Thus, in
Illinois, a person will now be considered dead for all legal purposes if
there is a diagnosis of total, irreversible cessation of brain activity or to-
tal, irreversible cessation of all circulatory and respiratory function.
Either diagnosis must be according to customary standards of medical
practice.
66
The practical effect of Haymer is to remove physicians who make
valid brain death diagnoses from potential liability. Haymer also elimi-
nates many proof of death problems. Complicated inquiries to determine
the moment of cessation of heart function are no longer needed. 67 Estab-
lishing that a certain injury was the cause of brain death should be
enough in many cases to establish the "moment" or cause of death.
68
Since Haymer follows the text of the UDDA, it implicitly acquires
broad support. 69 The language of Haymer is also clear enough to avoid
problems of construction such as those in Robaczynski and Bacchiochi.70
Haymer also stops short of prescribing rigid medical criteria that can be
subject to rapid change.
71
Potential Problems of Interpretation
The problem caused by strict reliance on traditional signs of death
are clear. A shift to the brain death standard, however, can create new
problems. Adoption of any standard based upon interpretations of con-
temporary technology introduces existing and potential problems that
accompany the development of that technology. Many of the difficulties
associated with brain death are intentionally outside of the scope of the
UDDA.
72
65. See supra note 31.
66. 115 I11. App. 3d at 356, 450 N.E.2d at 945, 71 111. Dec. at 257.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 17-23..
68. In Woodward v. Blythe, 249 Ark. 793, 439 S.W.2d 919 (1969), a wrongful death suit was
brought against two drivers involved in an auto accident. The plaintiffs decedent was killed when
his car was struck head on by the first defendant's car, then struck in the rear by the second defend-
ant's car. The only medical evidence of death presented was the coroner's report listing "Brain
injury and Internal Injuries" from a head on collision as cause of death. A judgment for the plaintiff
was reversed and a new trial was granted to determine which collision caused death. Given the
precision of the science of forensic pathology, an inquiry into the cause of death could be simplified
by ascertaining which impact delivered the injury causing brain death.
69. See supra note 31.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 34-39.
71. In an environment of rapidly changing medical technology, legislative endorsement of spe-
cific diagnositic procedures will result either in a need for constant amendments or continued vari-
ances between law and technology. National, provincial or territorial brain death laws describing
specific medical measures are in effect in Argentina, Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Finland and
France. See President's Commission, supra note 34 at 147-58.
72. John M. McCabe, Legislative Director of the National Conference of Commissioners on
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One possible problem relates to the present technological ability to
keep a body functioning for an extended period after a declaration of
brain death. Depending on which criteria are applied, this time may
range from days to months.73 In the case of a brain-dead expectant
mother, for example, the body can be kept alive until the fetus reaches
viability. 74 It is possible that a future court will be faced with balancing
the interests of the state in a potentially viable fetus 75 with the interests of
the mother's family or husband who may oppose continued respiration.
Another consideration is whether the need for organ donors will en-
courage hasty declarations of brain death, or whether there will be a
trend to prolonged life support after declarations of death for transplant
purposes. 76 The best method of organ preservation is, of course, within a
"living" human body. 77 A diagnosis of brain death "early enough in the
dying process" can prevent "unnecessary deterioration of organs".
78
Taken to extremes, this raises the possibility of the "bioemporium"
where "neomorts" are sustained mechanically. 79 Bodies artificially
maintained could provide a continuous source of organs, antibodies, and
blood, as well as being used for experimentation.8 0  If this concept is
currently unacceptable, as the average age of our population and average
life expectancies both increase,"' attitudes could change. The court may
Uniform State Laws, said the UDDA, supra note 28, "does not deal with individual liability of
physicians . . . living wills, death with dignity, euthanasia, life support beyond brain death in preg-
nant women or organ donors, and protection of dead bodies." McCabe, The New Determination of
Death Act, 67 A.B.A. J. 1476, 1478 (1981).
73. Black, supra note 11 at 339.
74. Dillon, Life Support and Maternal Brain Death During Pregnancy, 248 J. A.M.A. 1089
(1982).
75. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973).
76. Even though many states provide a review system for declaring death in transplant-donor
cases (see, e.g., Ala. Code § 22-31-3(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979)) these procedures may not prevent an
erosion to less rigid diagnostic criteria under the pressure of meeting increasing organ donation
needs. There are other factors to consider, as well. For example, one of the first cases to deal
directly with brain death was Tucker v. Lower, as discussed in R. CONNELL, supra, note 5, at 37. In
Tucker, a wrongful death suit was brought against physicians who terminated life support on a
brain-dead patient for organ donation purposes. The suit was brought by the patient's brother. The
physicians did not contact the brother even though the patient had his brother's business card on his
person when admitted through hospital emergency.
77. Cryopreservation (low temperature storage) is a promising technology for future long-term
(weeks to years) storage of massive human organs, especially kidneys. KAROW, ORGAN PRESERVA-
TION FOR TRANSPLANTATION, 517-544 (2d ed. 1981).
78. R. CONNELLY, supra note 5 at 43.
79. W. Gaylin, Harvesting the Dead, 249 Harper's 23 (1974).
80. Id. at 26-28.
81. The burden on the health care industry will increase at the turn of the century when the
number of Americans over the age of 85 will increase by 300% over 1978 figures. Elderly Boom at
Turn of Century, Chi. Trib., Feb. 5, 1984, § 6, at 7, col. I. Presently, 21% of the U.S. population is
between 40 and 60. Entering Middle Age: What to Do With the Rest of Your Life? Chi. Trib., Feb. 5,
1984, § 2, at 1, col. I.
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In addition to the potential problems discussed earlier in the appli-
cation of a brain death standard, other problems exist that can arise to-
day. The most serious problem in using the brain death standard is in
deciding at what point the diagnosis should be made, since brain death
does not actually occur at a "moment" but is rather a process.83 The
following hypothetical illustrates how the application of brain death can
lead to ambiguous results: December 1: Patient admitted through the
emergency ward with severe head injuries and no vital signs; preliminary
examination indicates possible brain death; December 2: Comprehensive
clinical and laboratory tests show probable brain death; December 3: A
confirmatory EEG shows no sign of brain activity; December 4: Physi-
cians terminate life support at 11:58 PM; December 5: Patient breathes
without assistance for a few moments after termination of life support
(not uncommon in brain death) but spontaneous respiration premanently
ceases at 12:04 AM, December 6.
Assuming no formal declaration of death was made during this pro-
cess,8 4 when did the patient die? An autopsy could support a finding of
death on admission, December 1; greater weight could be given to com-
prehensive tests administered on December 2; most laws and criteria re-
quire a confirmatory EEG,8 5 so death could be declared on December 3;
it could be argued that the onset of death was at termination of respira-
tion, December 4; death could also have been "pronounced" with cessa-
tion of spontaneous respiration on December 5. Such a determination is
of particular importance in criminal proceedings, insurance cases, inheri-
tance cases or malpractice, where time of death may be a critical element.
Problems of interpretation of a UDDA-type standard are evident in
the recent case of State v. Long.8 6 In Long, the defendant was accused of
aggravated vehicular homicide and several traffic violations after his in-
82. The court plays a necessary role in the determination of these conflicts. There are advan-
tages in the judicial process not available in medical judgment. Judicial review is public, adversarial
and impartial, and the decisions are stated on principles of law. See Baron, Medical Paternalism and
the Rule of Law. A Reply to Dr. Relman, 4 AM. J. LAW MED. 337 (1979).
83. See People v. Bonilla, 95 A.D.2d 396, 423-24, 467 N.Y.S.2d 599, 616 (1983).
84. Haymer permits a declaration of death based on brain activity, but does not expressly state
when that declaration should be made. Haymer, 115 I1. App. 3d 349, 450 N.E.2d 940, 71 Ill. Dec.
252 (1983).
85. See, e.g., the Harvard Criteria, supra, note 12.
86. 7 Ohio App. 3d 248, 455 N.E.2d 534 (1983).
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volvement in an auto accident that injured one child and killed another.8 7
The accident occurred on December 3, 1981. One of the victims,
11-year-old Steven Brown, was admitted that day to the hospital with no
vital signs; respiration was chemically induced and artificially main-
tained.8 8 On December 4, defendant pled guilty to the traffic charges.
Respiration on the boy was discontinued on December 7 after a diagnosis
of brain death. Defendant was indicted for manslaughter on December
23. He was convicted, and the conviction was affirmed.
On appeal the defendant made a double-jeopardy argument, based
on his indictment for manslaughter subsequent to his guilty pleas for the
traffic offenses.8 9 It was essential to the defendant's argument that the
victim be found dead on December 3, before defendant entered his pleas.
The Long court rejected this assumption of death, stating that the "fun-
damental fact" underlying the manslaughter charge, the death of the vic-
tim, had not occurred until December 7, after defendant had entered his
pleas. 90
The Long court relied on a definition of brain death substantially the
same as that in Haymer and the UDDA, but did not interpret that defini-
tion as did the Haymer court. Alex Haymer's death was diagnosed on
October 23; respiration would have been terminated (had there been no
stay) on November 4. Haymer held that the date of death was the date of
the diagnosis, October 23.91 Steven Brown was pronounced dead on De-
cember 7 and respiration was discontinued. The essential difference be-
tween these two cases is that in Haymer, the date of death was the date of
diagnosis. In Long, the actual pronouncement of death controlled.
Under Long's interpretation, Alex Haymer's status from October 23 to
November 4 would be undefined, while under Haymer, the defendant in
Long may have been able to introduce evidence to support a date of
death prior to termination of respiration.
Another problem in applying a brain death standard in Illinois is
whether the Haymer decision will have any substantial effect at all. A
recent survey based on the Bowman case provides a good example. 92 The
Bowman ruling was in 1980. A telephone survey of Washington hospi-
tals was conducted three years later to determine whether hospitals had
87. 7 Ohio App. 3d at 248, 455 N.E.2d at 535.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 7 Ohio App. 3d at 250, 455 N.E.2d at 536. The case applied the Ohio brain death law,
OHIo REV. CODE § 2801.30 (1983).
91. See text accompanying notes 40-41.
92. Tyler & Robertson, Impact of Brain Death Ruling in Washington State, 140 West. J. Med.
625 (1984).
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altered their practices in light of the new standard.93
The results of the survey indicate that Bowman has had little effect
on actual medical practice. While 77% of the surveyed hospitals differ-
entiated cases of brain death from irreversible coma, the remainder made
no distinction at all.94 No review is required of a brain death determina-
tion in 85% of the hospitals. 95 Significantly, 43% of the surveyed hospi-
tals were unfamiliar with the Bowman decision, and 40% of the hospitals
familiar with the decision were unfamiliar with its details. 96 It seems
unlikely that an Illinois survey would produce results different from
those of the Washington survey.
97
Problems in applying a brain death standard will emerge as technol-
ogy advances. Methods of reliable brain death diagnosis will probably
improve.98 Another developing technology is brain restoration.99 If pro-
gress in both areas continue, doctors may soon be forced to choose be-
tween brain restoration and organ transplant. Increased organ
transplant activity will probably also make the application of the brain
death standard more frequent, with more opportunities for unexpected
conflict.
Alternatives to Judicial Enactment
Two New York cases indicate that Haymer could have determined
the issue before it without resorting to judicial enactment of brain death
legislation. In NYC Health and Hospitals Corp. v. Sulsona1°° and People
93. Questions were addressed to "knowledgeable persons" at the hospitals. Some of the ques-
tions included "Have any formal criteria been developed by the hospital to be used to determine
brain death?" and "Has this topic caused significant problems at your hospital?" Id.
94. 91% of surveyed hospitals make no distinction between brain death and persistent vegeta-
tive state. Id. at 626.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Telephone calls made by the author in October, 1984, to the Chicago Hospital Council and
the Illinois State Medical Society revealed that these associations had not issued any statements or
proposed directives since Haymer.
98. Current brain death diagnostic technology was recently almost tragically misapplied. Alan
Supergan, a 20 year old man, was involved in an auto accident and suffered severe brain damage. He
was pronounced dead by a neurosurgeon when no brain activity was detected. Family members
consented to organ donation. Supergan coughed as he was being prepared for kidney removal. He
was returned to life support, but suffered irreversible heart failure three days later. Patient Who
Came Back to Life Dies, Chi. Trib., Feb. 12, 1984, § 4, at 8, col. 1.
99. Brain tissue transplantation was once believed impossible, but recent research is promising.
See Brain-Tissue Transplants? 91 Sci. Dig. 7:85 (1983) and Brain Tissue Transplants-From Science
Fiction to Fact, 101 New Scientist 1395:21 (1984). There are indications that fetal brain cells may be
most adaptable to transplant. Id. The implications of this new technology are especially serious in
the case of patients like Alan Supergan, supra, note 98.
100. 81 Misc. 2d 1002, 367 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1975).
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v. Bonilla, 10 the courts of New York were asked to make brain death
determinations. Each court declined to give holdings broad enough to be
considered new definitions of death for New York law.
In Sulsona, a hospital sought declaratory judgment to define
death. 102 Hospital physicians, apprehensive of criminal liability, refused
to terminate life support on a patient who was brain dead, and geneti-
cally matched for kidney transplant. 10 3 The court did not provide the
hospital with the definition it sought, but held that the word "death" as
used in the New York organ transplant law' °4 suggested a legislative in-
tent to conform the law with customary medical practice in defining
death.105 While this decision implicitly recognized brain death, it did not
have the effect of permanently changing New York law to a brain death
standard. 1
0 6
The definition of death was again at issue in the Bonilla case. The
trial court had rejected defendant's request for instructions on both brain
death and common law death; the failure to give these definitions to the
jury was the basis for his appeal of a manslaughter conviction.10 7 The
conviction was affirmed on the basis of the judge's "very thorough in-
structions" that enabled the jury to decide whether the defendant's ac-
tions had caused the victim's death.' 08 Even though there was a majority
opinion, a concurrence, and two dissents, there was total agreement that
the decision should be made upon the facts of the case without reliance
upon a judicially-enacted definition of death. After considering the com-
plicated factual nature of the question, and the shifting nature of medical
technology, the court felt that such a change was more appropriate for
the lawmakers. 10 9
Haymer could have taken an approach similar to Sulsona and
Bonilla. Extensive expert testimony" 10 was presented in Haymer to sup-
101. 95 A.D.2d 396, 467 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1983).
102. 81 Misc. 2d at 1003, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
103. Id. The brain-dead patient eventually suffered permanent cardiac arrest and the transplant
did not take place.
104. N.Y. PuB. HLTH. LAW § 4300 et seq. (1983).
105. 81 Misc. 2d at 1007, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 691.
106. See also Cranmore v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 722, 271 N.W.2d 402 (1978).
107. Bonilla, 95 A.D.2d at 430-31, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 619 (Titone, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 412, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 610 (Titone, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 424-26, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 616-18. The New York Court of Appeals recently affirmed
Bonilla and another case. The court held that brain death was acceptable as a legal definition of
death. This decision does not discredit the approaches used in Sulsona and Bonilla to resolve the
death question without resorting to judicial enactment of brain death legislation. See People v. Eulo,
63 N.Y.2d 341, 482 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1984).
110. 115 11. App. 3d at 356, 450 N.E.2d at 946, 71 111. Dec. at 258.
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port the brain death determination. Principles of judicial notice I I would
have enabled the appellate court to accept a brain death determination
even though the lower court had not directly addressed the issue.'1 2 In
this way, Haymer could have served as precedent for allowing introduc-
tion of neurological evidence of death without performing a legislative
function. Unfortunately, the Haymer adoption of the UDDA combined
with the existence of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act may deter sup-
plemental legislation that could anticipate situations more factually com-
plex than Haymer.113 In all likelihood, as technology advances, the
question of when death occurs will continue to create confusion and pro-
duce non-uniform results.
V. CONCLUSION
Exclusive adherence to the common law definition of death can lead
to judicial determinations at variance with current medical practice. By
placing Illinois in the mainstream of states recognizing brain death in
some form, Haymer helps to avoid some of these results.
However, Haymer fails to sufficiently recognize or deal with the
problems that will inevitably arise from application of a new standard
based entirely on contemporary technology. The Haymer opinion could
have been more narrowly worded to avoid the effect of judicial enact-
ment of a brain death definition. The brain death issue is a factually
complicated one, and has broad implications. Needed legislative atten-
tion may actually be discouraged by the Haymer decision.
111. See Wheeler v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 11 111. App. 3d 841, 298 N.E.2d 329 (1973), vacated
on other grounds, 57 Il. 2d 104, 311 N.E.2d 134 (1974).
112. Id. at 854, 298 N.E.2d at 338.
113. Other significant judicial departures from common law that have not been followed by
needed legislative clarification include Alvis, supra, note 54 and Spring v. Little, 50 111. 2d 351, 280
N.E.2d 208 (1972), in which Illinois judicially adopted the doctrine of implied fitness of leased
premises.
